A spin of the wheel? Defence procurement and defence industries in the Brexit debate by Uttley, Matthew Richard Hinchliffe & Wilkinson, Benedict James
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1111/1468-2346.12605
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Uttley, M. R. H., & Wilkinson, B. J. (2016). A spin of the wheel? Defence procurement and defence industries in
the Brexit debate. International Affairs (London), 92(3), 569-586. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12605
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
  
A spin of the wheel? Defence procurement and defence industries in the Brexit debates 
MATTHEW R. H. UTTLEY AND BENEDICT WILKINSON* 
 
* The authors are grateful to Benjamin Kienzle for his comments on an earlier version of this 
article and to the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions. 
  
As the pro-Brexit and pro-Remain campaigns approach maximum velocity in the run-up to 
the ‘in–out’ referendum on British membership of the European Union scheduled for 23 June 
2016, vociferous debate continues over a range of critical issues. Few have been more hotly 
debated, along with the migrant crisis and the UK’s economy, than the future of the UK’s 
national security. Indeed, ever since David Cameron returned from Europe with his new deal, 
there has been something of a ‘blizzard’1 of claims and counter-claims concerning whether 
Britain’s international status and ability to respond to existential threats, including the rise of 
the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and resurgent Russian nationalism, would 
be undermined by departure from the EU.2 
Those in the ‘Remain’ campaign essentially argue that leaving the EU would ‘threaten’ the 
UK’s ‘economic and national security’.3 This was precisely the language used in a notable 
public letter to the Daily Telegraph from former chiefs of the armed services, claiming that 
Europe faces a series of ‘grave security challenges’ and that the UK is in a ‘stronger’ position 
to deal with them from inside the EU.4 Those making up the ‘Leave’ campaign have argued 
the opposite, accusing Mr Cameron and their opponents of egregious ‘scaremongering’ and 
 
1 Jon Hay, ‘The Brexit fight is on: look to the big issues’, Global Capital, 2 Feb. 2016, 
http://www.globalcapital.com/article/wbf49lhy8xxc/the-brexit-fight-is-on-look-to-the-big-
issues. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were 
accessible on 6 March 2016.)  
2 See e.g. Nick Witney, Brexit to nowhere: the foreign policy consequences of ‘out’ 
(European Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 2015), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/FP_Brexit_1141.pdf; Oliver Daddow, ‘Strategising European policy: David Cameron’s 
referendum gamble’, RUSI Journal 160: 5, pp. 4–10; Nick Witney, ‘The UK in European 
defence: an open goal for Britain’, RUSI Journal 160: 5, pp. 12–15. 
3 HM Government, Prime Minister’s statement following Cabinet meeting on EU settlement, 
20 Feb. 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-statement-following-cabinet-
meeting-on-eu-settlement-20-february-2016.  
4 Steven Swinford and Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Military leaders warn against a Brexit’, Daily 
Telegraph, 21 Feb. 2016, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/12167570/Military-leaders-to-
warn-against-a-Brexit.html.  
  
‘Project Fear’ tactics that exaggerate national security and economic risks if the UK were to 
exit the EU.5 
The UK’s national security, then, is a central theme in the UK’s debate over membership of 
the EU. One of the most important, but often overlooked, elements of this debate is defence 
procurement and the defence industries. These are vital elements of national security because 
they ensure that the UK has a secure supply chain, that it has technological advantage over 
rivals and that it has the freedom to act when and where it chooses. The government has 
recently acknowledged the key role of UK defence procurement expenditure and domestic 
defence and security industries in the promotion of national economic growth and prosperity 
in its National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015.6 This is 
hardly surprising: the domestic defence and security industry has an annual turnover of £30 
billion per annum, including defence and security exports worth £11.9 billion, and the 
government estimates that it employs 215,000 predominantly highly skilled personnel and 
supports a further 150,000 jobs in supply chains.7 Defence procurement is a significant issue 
for other EU member states, too. European Defence Agency (EDA) research suggests that 
any reductions in aggregate EU-wide defence procurement spending (including in the UK) 
 
5 See Tom McTague and Mark Leftly, ‘EU referendum: Michael Gove attacks David 
Cameron’s claim Brexit would damage national security’, Independent, 20 Feb. 2016, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-michael-gove-david-cameron-
brexit-national-security-a6886711.html. 
6 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 
2015: a secure and prosperous United Kingdom, Cm. 9161 (London, The Stationery Office), 
2015. 
7 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 
2015. The source for these employment statistics and to which year they refer are unclear. Up 
to 2009, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) published annual estimates of national and regional 
full-time jobs in the UK that were dependent on MoD expenditure and defence exports. In 
2009, the government decided that the MoD would no longer publish these estimates on the 
grounds that the ‘data do not directly support MoD policy making and operations’. The result 
has been that the last official MoD estimates of UK defence-industrial employment were 
published in 2009 and refer to employment levels during 2007/08. For an extended 
discussion, see Andrew Dorman, Matthew Uttley and Benedict Wilkinson, A benefit, not a 
burden, Policy Institute at King’s Paper (London: King’s College London, 2015), pp. 38–42. 
  
following a Brexit would be significant: the impact of each €100 million cut from EU 
defence industry expenditure would entail a €150 million fall in EU GDP, a €40 million fall 
in EU tax revenues and the loss of 2,870 jobs, 760 of them skilled.8  
The lack of attention hitherto paid in the debate to defence procurement and the UK defence 
industry raises the risk of UK voters being forced to make their choice in the referendum 
without adequate information about a key area of economic and national security with 
potentially significant implications for the UK and other EU member states. This would not 
be the first time in recent UK referendum history. During the run-up to the September 2014 
vote on Scottish independence, the handful of analyses of the defence procurement and 
industrial outcomes of a Scottish exit that did emerge appeared too late to inform pre-
referendum debates.9 There is currently a real risk of history repeating itself in this respect, 
raising the urgent need for rigorous analysis to inform public debate as the EU referendum 
date approaches. 
This article explores the arguments likely to be presented by supporters of the Leave and 
Remain options concerning the potential implications of a Brexit for defence procurement 
and the defence industries in the UK and in other EU member states. Our basic objective is to 
expose the underlying assertions and assumptions, the evidence bases and the narratives that 
are likely to underpin the competing claims and counter-claims in the debate. By so doing, 
we seek not only to inform all sides of the debate, but also to demonstrate how these 
arguments will be deployed in the Brexit debate. Ultimately we argue that, in the absence of a 
strong evidence base, on the crucial element of the key battleground that is national security 
the fight will be conducted through politics, ideology and spin. In short, it will be left to the 
fates to decide. 
This article is divided into three sections. The first section analyses the context of a Brexit 
through the prism of the existing level of EU defence procurement integration affecting the 
 
8 European Defence Agency (EDA), ‘Fact sheet: the economic case for investing in Europe’s 
defence industry’, Jan. 2015, http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/publications/publication-
details/factsheet-the-economic-case-for-investing-in-europe-s-defence-industry.  
9 See Colin Fleming and Carmen Gebhard, ‘Scotland, NATO, and transatlantic security’, 
European Security 23: 3, Sept. 2014, pp. 307–25; J. MacDonald, ‘A blessing in disguise? 
Scottish independence and the end of the UK nuclear posture’, European Security 23: 3, Sept. 
2014, pp. 326–43; Andrew Dorman, ‘More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security 
implications of Scottish independence’, International Affairs 90: 3, 2014, pp. 679–96. 
  
UK’s and Europe’s defence industries. The second section constructs the cases that are likely 
to be presented by pro-Brexit and pro-Remain advocates in the UK and other EU member 
states. In order to do this, we draw on Jozef Bátora’s ‘institutional logics’ framework to 
develop two pro-Brexit and two pro-Remain positions.10 On the one hand, there are pro-
Brexit and pro-Remain ‘logics’ that emphasize the primacy of national defence sovereignty: 
proponents of these are likely to agree that EU security policy should be developed primarily 
within NATO and that EU defence market participation should be extended to include non-
EU states, but disagree on the implications of a British exit. On the other, there are pro-Brexit 
and pro-Remain ‘logics’ that contend that the goal of ‘ever closer union’ requires the pooling 
of EU resources in the development of a credible Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP): here, contention is likely to surround the implications of a Brexit for the fostering of 
intra-EU defence procurement and industrial cooperation, defence market liberalization and 
the development of a credible European defence technological and industrial base. In the 
concluding section, we draw these elements together to explore how the competing logics are 
likely to play out in the battle of narratives between the ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ campaigns as 
the UK referendum approaches.  
Defence procurement and industrial policy in the UK and EU 
Ever since modern states began to emerge, national governments, seeking to exercise their 
own sovereignty, have been protective of their autonomy in developing, producing and 
procuring military goods and services.11 This preoccupation is reflected in international 
norms that recognize the right of states to retain security and sovereignty through their 
control over the production and procurement of defence materiel. This normative stance sits 
in tension with EU initiatives intended to liberalize defence procurement markets, with the 
result that while the EU has succeeded in creating a single market for public procurement of 
civil goods and services, the scope for market liberalization in the defence procurement sector 
has been limited.  
Indeed, defence procurement has, in essence, remained largely immune from the drive 
towards open markets. The current vehicle used by EU member states to ensure that they 
 
10 Jozef Bátora, ‘European Defence Agency: a flashpoint of institutional logics’, West 
European Politics 32: 6, Nov. 2009, p. 1093.  
11 See Charles Tilly, Coercion, capital and the European state, AD 990–1990 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990); Martin van Creveld, Rise and decline of the states (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
  
retain control over defence procurement is article 346 of the 2007 Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (the Lisbon Treaty). This article, which has remained largely unchanged since the 
1957 Treaty of Rome,12 stipulates that: 
<ext>Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection 
of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production or trade in 
arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of 
competition in the common market regarding products which are not intended for specifically 
military purposes.<extend> 
article 346 provisions have effectively allowed EU member states to ‘set their own rules’ for 
the tendering of defence-related contracts.13 As Jay Edwards observes, this has perpetuated 
longstanding arrangements whereby 
<ext>each member state with indigenous industrial capability ensures that it spends the 
majority of any investment in defence domestically to protect the industry from any 
competition and to sustain what has long been seen as a manufacturing sector of strategic 
significance nationally.14<extend>  
A succession of studies have sought to identify the ‘costs of non-Europe’—essentially, the 
costs arising from the gaps in and barriers to a truly integrated and competitive EU single 
market. In the realm of defence, the latest (2015) European Parliament report mapping the 
‘costs of non-Europe’ estimates these as ranging ‘from some 130 billion euro, at the high end, 
to at least 26.0 billion euro per year, on a more cautious estimate’.15 Or, to put it another way, 
the failure to integrate comes at a price: ‘The existence of 28 compartmentalised national 
markets, each with its own administrative burden and regulated separately, hinders 
competition and results in a missed opportunity for economies of scale for industry and 
production.’16 
 
12 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC), 1 January 1958. 
13 Felix Bungay, Defence policy and procurement (London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 
2012), p. 11. 
14 Jay Edwards, The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: a step towards 
affordability? (London: Chatham House, 2011), p. 4. 
15 European Parliamentary Research Unit (EPRU), Mapping the cost of non-Europe, 2014–19 
(Brussels: European Parliament, April 2015), p. 21. 
16 EPRU, Mapping the cost of non-Europe, p. 77. 
  
Despite widespread recognition of the ‘costs of non-Europe’, defence equipment production 
and procurement are driven by the national interests and sovereignty concerns of member 
states and thus continue to be sui generis. Nevertheless, the European Commission has 
progressively sought to overcome EU defence market fragmentation and the duplicative 
defence programmes resulting from the protectionist application of article 346 by the member 
states.17 Commission initiatives have focused on stimulating greater intra-EU defence trade 
by making EU governments put more non-sensitive, non-article 346 defence contracts out to 
tender. More recently, the Commission’s proposals for a European defence technological and 
industrial base (EDTIB) have sought to safeguard Europe’s defence markets against 
international competition and enhance the operational autonomy of the EU states within the 
CSDP and NATO.18 In July 2009, the European Parliament and Council adopted Directive 
2009/81/EC on defence procurement, the latest Commission-led attempt to confine the use of 
article 346 by member states to ‘clearly exceptional cases’.19  
These initiatives have had little impact; national protectionist practices—whether motivated 
by ‘essential security’ considerations or by the desire to preserve domestic jobs and 
industries—remain the dominant driving force in EU defence procurement. Indeed, the value 
of Directive 2009/81/EC has been questioned from the outset, as member states have flouted 
its provisions, either by continuing to promote protectionist procurement practices or by 
 
17 European Commission, The challenges facing the European defence related industry: a 
contribution for actions at the European level, COM (96) 10 final (Brussels, 1996); European 
Commission, Implementing European Union strategy on defence related industries, COM 
(97) 583 final (Brussels, 1997); European Commission, Green paper of 23 September 2004 
on defence procurement, COM (2004) 608 final (Brussels, 2004). 
18 For an extended analysis, see Daniel Fiott, ‘European defence-industrial cooperation: from 
Keynes to Clausewitz’, Global Affairs 1: 2, 2015, pp. 159–67. 
19 For an extended analysis, see Michael Blauberger and Moritz Weiss, ‘If you can’t beat me, 
join me! How the Commission pushed and pulled member states into legislating defence 
procurement’, Journal of European Public Policy 20: 8, 2013, pp. 1120–38; Fulvio 
Castellacci, Arne Martin Fevolden and Martin Lundmark, ‘How are defence companies 
responding to EU defence and security market liberalisation? A comparative study of Norway 
and Sweden, Journal of European Public Policy 21: 8, 2014, pp. 1218–35; Catherine 
Hoeffler, ‘European armaments co-operation and the renewal of industrial policy motives’, 
Journal of European Public Policy 19: 3, 2012, pp. 435–51. 
  
exploiting the government-to-government sales exemption in the directive to safeguard their 
respective domestic defence-industrial bases. The latest EDA estimates, for instance, indicate 
that approximately 80 per cent of EU defence expenditure not assigned to international 
collaborative weapons projects is spent nationally.20 Although research sponsored by the 
European Commission acknowledges that ‘this does not mean that these 80% are exclusively 
spent on equipment from national suppliers’, it does indicate that the degree of openness to 
suppliers from other member states has been ‘relatively low’.21 The ambiguity concerning the 
EDA 80 per cent ‘headline’ statistic stems in part from the fact that data collected and 
provided by national governments are often incomplete. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
statistical publications, for example, no longer differentiate between defence equipment and 
equipment support sourced from the UK and that sourced via direct imports.22 
While the European single market is based on the principles of transparency and competition 
for civil goods and services, then, different rules (and norms) apply for defence materials and 
services. A recent study for the European Parliament of the impact of Directive 2009/81/EC 
demonstrated that its impact on pan-EU tendering for defence contracts has been limited.23 
On the one hand, it shows that since the Directive came into force all of the major equipment 
contracts issued by the EU member states were awarded using article 346 provisions, which 
suggests that previous national procurement practices have continued. On the other, where 
pan-EU tendering has been adopted by the member states it has been for contracts ‘dealing 
with services, the acquisition of equipment deemed to be of low value, and sub-systems’.24 
Moreover, the data show that since 2011 the proportion of selected suppliers located on 
national territory following pan-EU tendering for contracts has reached 98 per cent for 
Germany, 97 per cent for France, 96 per cent for Italy, 96 per cent for Poland, 92 per cent for 
the UK, 90 per cent for Romania and 64 per cent for Finland.  
 
20 European Commission, Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security 
sector, Commission staff working document, Brussels, 24 July 2013. 
21 European Commission, Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security 
sector. 
22 See Dorman et al., A benefit, not a burden, p. 40. 
23 European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, The impact of the ‘defence 
package’ directives on European defence (Strasbourg, June 2015), p. 6. 
24 European Parliament, The impact of the ‘defence package’ directives, p. 6. 
  
It was against this backdrop of protectionism in defence procurement that the British 
government launched its overarching ‘review of the balance of competences between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union’ in July 2012. The review sought to audit what the 
EU does, how it affects the UK, where competence lies, how the EU’s competences are used, 
and what that means for the UK’s national interest’.25 Its primary findings relating to defence 
procurement were threefold. The first was that the European Commission has progressively 
claimed ‘more competences in this particular area’ and ‘sees an even broader role for itself’, 
raising concerns about a potential shift of competences from the EU member states to 
Brussels. The second was that there is scope for the Commission to take a more proactive 
stance within its existing competence, notably preventing ‘abuses’ of article 346 by those 
member states using it as a pretext to discriminate against non-national bidders for non-
sensitive defence contracts.26 In identifying this possibility, the review reaffirmed the UK 
government’s support for efforts to open up the EU defence market to more competition and 
eliminate economically driven ‘buy national’ policies, ‘while respecting member states’ right 
to maintain certain strategic industrial capabilities for reasons of national security’.27 Finally, 
the review reaffirmed that the UK government ‘does not support any extension of 
Commission competence’.28  
The clash of ‘logics’: claims and counter-claims over defence procurement and defence 
industry in the Brexit debates 
Taken together, all this suggests that EU institutions have sought greater transparency and 
competitiveness in public procurement markets, but that when it comes to defence, member 
states have exploited specific aspects of European procurement policy to ensure greater 
autonomy in respect of their defence procurement. Defence procurement and defence-
 
25 HM Government, Review of the balance of competences between the United Kingdom and 
the European Union, Cm. 8415 (London: TSO, 2012), p. 6. 
26 HM Government, Review of the balance of competences between the United Kingdom and 
European Union. The single market: free movement of services (London: TSO, 2014), pp. 
85–6. 
27 House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Defence acquisition: government response 
to the committee’s seventh report of Session 2012–2013, HC 73, May 2013. For an extended 
analysis, see House of Commons Library, Leaving the EU, research paper no. 13/42, 1 July 
2013, pp. 85–90. 
28 HM Government, Review of the balance of competences: free movement of services, p. 42. 
  
industrial policy can, then, be seen as areas in which different ideas and values meet and 
clash: autonomy with commonality, protectionism with competition. Essentially, these 
attitudes towards defence procurement and the defence-industrial base can be boiled down to 
how far member states will and can integrate. Greater integration may make defence 
procurement options more affordable, but may also come at the price of decreased control 
over key areas of national security. Conversely, greater autonomy may make defence 
procurement more expensive, but enable national governments to retain control and 
sovereignty over these key industries, and to realize the economic and employment benefits 
of defence procurement at the national, rather than European, level. 
By thinking about defence procurement in terms of European integration, we can identify 
what Jozef Bátora describes as a set of competing ‘institutional logics’.29 Although these 
logics underpin contested claims about the benefits and costs for defence procurement of EU 
integration, they are also likely to underpin the arguments presented on both sides of the 
Brexit debate—particularly, the implications of Brexit for defence procurement and the 
defence-industrial base. To put it another way, both pro-Leave and pro-Remain campaigners 
are likely to redeploy an existing and well-worn set of arguments or ‘logics’ on the benefits 
and costs of Brexit for defence procurement. By drawing on Bátora’s framework, we can 
identify two pro-Brexit and two pro-Remain ‘logics’ that are likely to emerge as the UK 
approaches its in-or-out referendum (figure 1). In doing so, we expose the underlying 
assumptions, evidence bases and narratives that are likely to underpin the competing claims 
and counter-claims in the debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 Bátora, ‘European Defence Agency’, p. 1093. The various ‘logics’ developed in the 
remainder of this section draw directly from the terminology and taxonomy developed by 
Bátora. 
  
Figure 1: Taxonomy of ‘logics’, claims and counter-claims 
 
Logic 1: Pro-UK, Pro-Brexit: ‘Leaving will not undermine the UK’s defence procurement 
options or industrial capabilities’ 
The ‘logic’ advanced by supporters of the UK ‘Leave’ campaign in respect of UK defence 
procurement and the UK defence industry is likely to be predicated on three core 
assumptions. The first is that EU initiatives to date have had little effect on the national 
‘sovereignty’ of the UK or other EU member states because weapons procurement and 
armaments production decisions remain largely in the hands of national governments (the 
‘logic of defence sovereignty’). The second is that EU security policy is developed within 
NATO, so UK defence acquisition policies can continue to embrace national ventures, joint 
equipment development and other forms of defence technology transfers with EU and non-
EU NATO allies, notably the US (the ‘Euro-Atlanticist logic’). The third is likely to be that 
EU defence market participation policies purport to allow industrial participation from firms 
based in non-EU countries as well as EU member states (the ‘logic of liberalization of 
 
Pro-Brexit Pro-Remain 
Pro-
UK 
Logic 1:  
‘Leaving will not undermine the UK’s 
defence procurement options or industrial 
capabilities’ 
Emphasizes the ‘primacy of defence 
sovereignty; advocates a Euro-Atlanticist 
approach; argues that the UK will be able to 
access liberalized EU defence markets from 
outside the EU. 
Logic 2: 
‘There’s nothing to lose by staying in, but 
there are manifold risks for the UK in 
leaving’ 
Emphasizes the ‘primacy of defence 
sovereignty; advocates a Euro-Atlanticist 
approach; argues that the UK’s access to 
EU defence markets will be impeded if it is 
outside the EU. 
Pro-EU 
Logic 4:  
‘ A British exit will remove a barrier to 
other member states’ desire for “ever closer 
union” and a European Defence Union’ 
Emphasizes the logic of pooled defence 
resources; advocates a Europeanist 
approach to production and procurement; 
supports the ‘Europeanization’ of defence 
markets. 
Logic 3:  
‘Leaving will undermine the EU’s defence 
industry so that the EU and UK will rely on 
the US to an even greater extent’:  
Emphasizes the logic of pooled defence 
resources; advocates a Europeanist 
approach to production and procurement; 
supports the ‘Europeanization’ of defence 
markets. 
  
defence markets’), so a Brexit should not preclude future market access by the UK-based 
defence industry.  
On the basis of these core assumptions, Brexit advocates are likely to deploy the following 
arguments in support of the claim that a Brexit will have no detrimental impact on the 
defence procurement and defence-industrial policies of the UK or the remaining EU-27 
member states:  
1. The UK currently operates a de facto ‘sovereign’ defence procurement policy because the 
influence of EU common market initiatives has hitherto been limited. The UK government’s 
current demand-side policy, recently reaffirmed in the National Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, is founded on two core principles. The first is 
‘open procurement’: a default position that ‘seeks to fulfil the UK’s defence and security 
requirements through open competition on the domestic and global market’.30 The second is 
the principle of ‘technology advantage’, whereby the MoD takes action in procurement 
decisions to protect ‘operational advantage’ (the national ability to maintain and upgrade its 
defence technology) or ‘freedom of action’ (the ability to operate defence systems free from 
external intervention), but only where ‘this is essential for national security’.31 Brexit 
advocates are likely to argue that a UK exit from the EU would require no modification of 
what is already a de facto sovereign defence procurement policy predicated on open 
competition and limited measures to protect forms of operational sovereignty in weapons 
acquisition. Therefore, operating outside the EU would have no adverse impact on the UK’s 
general procurement approach. At the same time, the UK would no longer have to abide by 
existing obligations to tender contracts EU-wide, or ensure non-discrimination among EU 
member states in its assessment of bids. 
2. The UK has implemented its demand-side procurement principles through four alternative 
weapons acquisition strategies (figure 2), ranging from self-sufficient national programmes 
(e.g. the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier) through European collaborative programmes 
(e.g. the Eurofighter Typhoon), the manufacture within the domestic industry of technologies 
designed elsewhere (e.g. the AugustaWestland Apache AH-1 attack helicopter) to forms of 
inward technology transfer involving NATO and EU allies that include the ‘off-the-shelf’ 
import of complete weapons systems from the US (e.g. the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III 
 
30 Ministry of Defence, National security through technology: technology, equipment, and 
support for UK defence and security, Cm. 8278 (London, TSO, 2012), p. 13. 
31 MoD, National security through technology, p. 12. 
  
strategic lift aircraft). Brexit advocates are likely to claim that there is no obvious reason why 
Britain’s exit from the EU would require alteration to its existing ‘Euro-Atlanticist’ 
procurement strand of purchasing US-developed defence systems, or its current participation 
in collaborative weapons programmes with the remaining EU-27 states, which currently 
account for 26 per cent of total MoD equipment expenditure.32 Moreover, a Brexit would not 
require the UK to leave the intergovernmental Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation 
(OCCAR), which manages major armament projects such as the A400M tactical and strategic 
airlift aircraft, so institutional arrangements for collaboration with France, Germany, Spain 
and Belgium would remain in place.  
 
Figure 2: Alternative British weapons acquisition strategies 
 
Source: Andrew Dorman, Matthew Uttley and Benedict Wilkinson, A benefit, not a burden, King’s 
Policy Institute paper (London: King’s College London, 2015), p. 25. 
 
3. On the supply side, successive governments have claimed that the UK has ‘one of the most 
open defence markets in the world’.33 Since 2002, successive UK governments have defined 
the term ‘British defence industry’ to embrace ‘all defence suppliers [to the MoD and export 
markets] that create value, employment, technology or intellectual assets in the UK’, 
 
32 EDA, Defence data portal: defence data of the United Kingdom in 2013, 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal/United%20Kingdom/year/2013. 
33 MoD, Defence Industrial Strategy, Cm. 6697 (London: TSO, Dec. 2005), p. 15. 
  
including ‘both UK- and foreign-owned companies’.34 Britain’s ‘logic of liberalization of 
defence markets’ has enabled major European and US defence firms to establish onshore 
operations (table 1), compete without discrimination for MoD contracts and export orders, 
and develop local supply chains in the UK though forms of ‘industrial engagement’. Brexit 
advocates are likely to claim that Britain’s exit from the EU would not affect the ability of 
defence firms from the EU-27 or elsewhere from operating as part of Britain’s onshore 
defence-industrial base.  
 
Table 1: Top 10 Suppliers to the British MoD 2013-201435 
Company Ownership Percentage of UK Ministry of 
Defence procurement expenditure, 
2013-2014 
BAE Systems PLC UK 13.9 
Babcock International Group 
PLC 
UK 5.2 
Finmeccanica SpA Italy 3.6 
Airbus Group NV/EADS NV (trans-European) 3.6 
Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC UK 3.0 
Hewlett-Packard Company USA 2.9 
Lockheed Martin Corporation USA 2.8 
Serco Group PLC UK 2.2 
The Boeing Company   USA 2.0 
QinetiQ Group PLC UK 1.9 
Total percentage of UK MoD 
procurement expenditure 
 41.1 
 
 
 
4. Advocates of Brexit are likely to argue that Britain’s leaving the EU would have no effect 
on the country’s foreseeable defence procurement plans and commitments. In October 2015 
the MoD published its Defence Equipment Plan 2015, which set out the government’s latest 
detailed plans cumulatively to spend approximately £166 billion on new equipment and 
 
34 MoD, Defence Industrial Policy, policy paper no. 5 (London: Ministry of Defence,, 2002), 
p. 4.  
35 Ministry of Defence, Annual Statistical Series 1, Financial Series 1.01, Trade, Industry & Contracts, Ministry of Defence, 
2014 (Revised 27 November 2014), 2014, p. 14. 
  
equipment support up to 2024/25.36 A significant proportion of expenditure on major projects 
is already contractually committed.37 Thus far, Britain’s onshore defence industry has already 
been successful in securing involvement in a range of major projects including the Astute 
Class Submarine (BAE Systems) and the European collaborative Typhoon aircraft (BAE 
Systems, Airbus Group, Finmeccanica). Moreover, advocates are likely to claim that a Brexit 
will not alter the MoD’s current ability to select from domestic systems, European and US 
collaborative programmes, and off-the-shelf purchases when placing future orders funded 
from the currently uncommitted equipment budget.  
 
5. Brexit advocates are also likely to emphasize that as the major markets for UK defence 
exports are outside the EU, any dislocation caused by a British exit would have a limited 
impact on national defence trade. The evidence that is likely to be cited here is research 
commissioned by the European Parliament, which indicates that a negligible 4 per cent of UK 
defence industry turnover is accounted for by EU sales, with the remainder going to domestic 
sales (58 per cent) and non-EU export destinations (38 per cent).38  
6. Brexit advocates are likely to argue that a British exit from the EU should not adversely 
affect defence procurement and industrial policy options for the UK or the remaining EU-27 
states. They are likely to point out that when the European Commission first published the 
draft of what became Directive 2009/81/EC on defence procurement, the EU member states 
raised concerns over whether this would lead to the indirect adoption of a ‘buy Europe’ 
policy.39 In response, the Commission reassured the member states that: 
 
36 MoD, The Defence Equipment Plan 2015 (London, 2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470058/20151
022-Defence_Equipment_Plan_2015.pdf (accessed 11 March 2016).  
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falling to 16 per cent at the end of the decade. MoD, The Defence Equipment Plan 2015, p. 
10. 
38 Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, The extra-EU defence exports’ effects on European armaments 
cooperation (Brussels: European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies, 2015), 
p. 18. Total national defence turnover is estimated by adding domestic defence spending on 
equipment to estimated export revenues and subtracting estimated imports. 
39 For an extended analysis, see Claire Taylor, EC defence equipment directives, House of 
Commons standard note SN/IA/4640 (London: House of Commons Library, 3 June 2011), p. 
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<ext>This proposal does not in any way interfere with the right of member States to 
cooperate on defence procurement . . . [nor does it] interfere with Member State sovereignty 
on security and defence issues: it does not seek to determine what they should procure, or 
how much they will spend on defence.40<extend>  
By inference, Brexit advocates are likely to assert that if EU member states and institutions 
have no intention of implementing protectionist procurement measures, then existing 
opportunities for UK–EU defence trade and collaboration after a British exit would be 
unaffected. Moreover, if, during the withdrawal negotiations, the substance of Directive 
2009/81/EC were to be retained, then its applicability to UK procurement would not change.  
<linespace> 
<fl>On the basis of these assumptions and arguments, the pro-Brexit position is likely to 
correspond with Felix Bungay’s contention that:  
<ext>In practice the EU currently has little impact on UK defence policy, which tends to be 
more open to competition than is required by EU directives. Consequently, leaving the EU 
would have little impact on UK defence procurement. Of greater importance is wider 
European Defence co-operation, which the UK could still play a significant part in outside 
the EU given its largely intergovernmental nature.41 <extend> 
Logic 2: Pro-UK, pro-Remain: ‘There’s nothing to lose by staying in, but there are manifold 
risks for the UK in leaving’ 
A first pro-Remain logic is likely to frame its arguments as a pro-UK stance that identifies 
risks of a UK exit and gains from remaining. This logic is likely to provide the primary 
arguments for the UK ‘Remain’ campaign. This pro-UK pro-Remain position employs the 
same underpinning logics of ‘defence sovereignty’, ‘Euro-Atlanticism’ and ‘liberalization of 
defence markets’ adopted by its pro-UK, pro-Brexit opponents. This pro-UK pro-Remain 
logic is likely to deploy the following arguments: 
1. The central assumption in the pro-Brexit case is that the UK would not be worse off in the 
defence-industrial and procurement sphere if it were to exit the EU. Against this, the first pro-
UK and-Brexit argument is likely to be that if this is indeed so, then the UK would also be no 
worse off if it remained in the EU. That is to say, by remaining the UK could continue to 
operate a de facto ‘sovereign’ defence procurement policy because article 346 provisions 
 
40 European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal Market and Services, press 
conference, 5 Dec. 2007, cited in Taylor, EC defence equipment directives, pp. 13–14.  
41 Bungay, Defence policy and procurement, p. 18. 
  
would continue to protect national security considerations. Thus the UK would retain its 
ability to pursue ‘open procurement’ and to act in procurement decisions in such a way as to 
protect ‘operational advantage’ and ‘freedom of action’. Equally, the UK would remain free 
to continue its exiting ‘Euro-Atlanticist’ procurement approach by combining the purchase of 
US-developed defence systems and international collaboration with EU partner states on a 
case-by-case basis. Moreover, the UK would retain the ability to pursue the ‘logic of 
liberalization of defence markets’ through its open defence-industrial policy geared towards 
encouraging EU and US-based defence firms to establish onshore operations in Britain (table 
1). Finally, pro-UK pro-Remain proponents are likely to point out that the UK can continue 
its long-term defence procurement plans  and pursue intra-European and global defence 
exports if it remains in the EU. 
2. The second argument is likely to be that that the dislocation and uncertainties created by a 
Brexit risk the future prosperity of the defence element of the UK’s defence and security 
industries sector, which, according to government estimates, directly employs 162,400 
people, generates an additional 114,200 indirect jobs in the defence supply chain and creates 
a further 95,800 induced jobs in the UK economy.42 In making this argument, pro-Remain 
campaigners are likely to cite the findings of the 2015 ADS report The UK aerospace, 
defence, security and space industry and the EU, which presents the only systematic 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of how membership of the EU impacts on UK-based 
firms in these sectors.43 The headline findings of the ADS research are that 73 per cent of 
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43 ADS, The UK aerospace, defence, security and space industry and the EU: an assessment 
of the interaction of the UK’s aerospace, defence, security and space industry with the 
European Union (Farnborough: ADS, 2015). The ADS represents 900 UK-based companies 
across the aerospace, defence, security and space industries. The report presents the findings 
of a 2014 ADS/GfK NOP industry intelligence survey of 900 ADS members. 
  
firms believe that EU membership is positive for their business against 1 per cent who said it 
was negative, and that 86 per cent of ADS members would vote for the UK to stay in the EU 
against 2 per cent who would vote to leave.44 Respondents identified the primary benefits of 
continuing UK membership of the EU as being the opportunities for free trade within the 
Union; the simplicity of doing business in Europe because of existing regulations and 
directives; overall economic growth in the UK economy; access to EU suppliers and supply 
chains; and the ability to recruit skilled workers because of the free movement of EU labour. 
Correspondingly, the ADS findings suggest that a Brexit would inevitably jeopardize future 
foreign direct investment into the UK defence sector because ‘non membership would 
introduce a risk due to uncertainty over the [UK’s] post-EU economic environment and how 
conditions might change over the course of an investment’.45 That is to say: 
<ext>Because the UK is embedded in the EU supply chains for existing programmes, it is 
unlikely that an EU exit would impact on industry [involvement in these on-going 
programmes] over the long run and could be impossible to reverse. If investment decisions on 
new programmes of work are elsewhere, with EU OEMs [Original Equipment 
Manufacturers] allocating work within the EU, future generations will feel those impacts.46 
<extend> 
A particular concern that pro-Remain advocates are likely to highlight is the uncertainty to 
which a Brexit would give rise in respect of the future behaviour of the larger defence 
companies with operations in the UK that are headquartered in Europe, particularly 
Finmeccanica, Airbus Group and Thales UK. On the one hand, they are likely to point to 
uncertainty surrounding whether these companies would continue to invest in a UK that has 
distanced itself from the wider EU project. On the other, they are likely to suggest that the 
primary reason that these companies have remained outside the Brexit discourse is that their 
intervention might inadvertently trigger support for the Brexit camp. Remain advocates are 
also likely to point to similar concerns about uncertainty concerning future investments by 
large US firms following a Brexit, notably Northrop Grumman Europe, which is based in the 
UK. 
3. The third argument likely to be advanced from the pro-UK pro-Remain perspective is that 
an EU exit would not liberate the UK from compliance with EU regulations. Defence 
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industries based in the UK would still need to comply with the majority of EU regulations in 
order to trade with EU member states. At the same time, a Brexit would mean that the UK, as 
a non-member of the EU would have no direct influence over the content of this legislation. 
<linespace> 
<fl>On the basis of these arguments, the pro-UK pro-Remain camp is likely to argue that the 
UK is best served by remaining within the EU and by pursuing its national interests from 
within.  
Logic 3: Pro-EU, pro-Remain: ‘Leaving will undermine the EU’s defence industry so that the 
EU and UK will rely on the US to an even greater extent’ 
The prevailing logic of the second pro-Remain strand is likely to reflect the European 
Commission’s narrative that:  
<ext>For CSDP to be credible, Europe needs a strong defence-industrial and technological 
base. To achieve this objective, it is crucial further to develop the European Defence 
Industrial Base. To maintain a competitive industry capable of producing at affordable prices 
the capabilities we need, it is essential to strengthen the internal market for defence and 
security and to create conditions which enable European companies to operate freely in all 
Member States, while ensuring security of supply in Europe.47 <extend> 
This logic is likely to be employed by two distinct constituencies. The first comprises those in 
the pro-EU, pro-Remain grouping in the UK, and their counterparts in other EU states and 
institutions, who are committed to the EU goal of ‘ever closer union’. The second 
constituency is likely to comprise pro-UK, pro-Remain campaigners seeking to strengthen 
their ‘Remain’ arguments on national security and defence-industrial grounds, but in a 
manner that explicitly rejects a commitment to ‘ever closer union’.  
On the one hand, pro-EU, pro-Remain elements committed to the EU goal of ‘ever closer 
union’ are likely to emphasize three core assumptions. The first is that collective defence and 
the industry and armaments production to support it is a common endeavour among the EU 
states in the development of a credible CSDP (the ‘logic of pooled defence resources’). The 
second is that EU security policy should be developed within the framework of the CSDP by 
fostering joint defence acquisition programmes developed among EU states only (the 
‘Europeanist logic’). The third is that EU defence market liberalization should prioritize 
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intra-EU defence production to create an EDTIB, thereby limiting market access from non-
EU defence producers (the ‘logic of Europeanization of defence markets’). On this basis, 
Remain advocates are likely to claim that Britain’s exit from the EU will undermine the 
emergence of a competitive and strategically autonomous EDTIB, which, in turn, risks 
undermining the future ‘security of supply’ of defence equipment sourced from within 
Europe.48 The following arguments are likely to be mustered in support of this perspective.  
1. Evidence suggests that the unit production costs of major weapons systems (tactical 
combat aircraft, guided missiles, submarines, frigates, attack helicopters and self-propelled 
artillery) have been growing at up to 10 per cent per annum.49 National defence budgets in 
the EU member states have grown at the same time as equipment unit costs have been rising, 
but budgetary increases have been smaller than and ‘only partially compensate for the 
concurrent escalation in the unit cost of defence equipment’.50 Intergenerational cost 
increases in major weapons systems can be mitigated by maximizing economies of scale in 
production to counter costly fixed research and development costs. The US defence-industrial 
base is able to realize economies of scale because of the high output of its production lines to 
meet Department of Defence (DoD) equipment demand. Remain advocates are likely to 
claim that the strategically autonomous EDTIB necessary to ensure long-term security of 
supply of defence equipment sourced from within the EU requires economies of scale 
approaching levels achieved within the US defence-industrial base.  
2. Remain advocates are likely to claim that the EU member states and the European 
Commission alike have pursued policies and directives intended to remedy defence-industrial 
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duplication and inefficiency in intra-EU weapons research, development and production.51 
The current level of EU duplication in procurement and production is reflected in the 
situation whereby EU states have in use a total of 79 different weapons platforms and 
systems, compared to 21 in the United States, and have in operation 36 major equipment 
production lines, compared to eleven in the United States.52 Moreover, there is currently a 
transatlantic defence trade imbalance at approximately 7:1 in favour of the United States.53 
Nevertheless, Remain advocates are likely to assert that the longer-term effect of Directive 
2009/81/EC and other procurement initiatives intended to enhance defence-industrial 
efficiency and consolidation will ultimately remedy current diseconomies of scale in EU 
weapons production. 
3. On this basis, Remain advocates are likely to claim that Britain’s exit would fundamentally 
undermine initiatives already under way intended to remedy existing diseconomies of scale in 
EDTIB weapons production, thereby jeopardizing the long-term security of supply of major 
defence systems from within the EU. By implication, they are likely to claim that a Brexit 
would increase the likelihood that future major equipment programmes in the EU will 
confront affordability constraints, thereby increasing the risk that the EU states will become 
irreversibly dependent on US imports to meet their future national defence and security needs 
in core capability areas.54  
<linespace> 
<fl>On the other hand, pro-UK, pro-Remain campaigners seeking to strengthen their 
arguments are likely to emphasize that staying in the EU provides the UK with future options 
in the national interest that might be foreclosed if Britain were to leave. In particular, they are 
likely to emphasize that by remaining in the EU, the UK would retain the option to 
participate selectively in EDTIB initiatives, measures to ensure long-term UK security of 
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supply of defence equipment sourced from within the EU, and other initiatives deemed 
beneficial to national defence and security.  
Logic 4: Pro-EU, Pro-Brexit: ‘A British exit will remove a barrier to other member states’ 
desire for “ever closer union” and a European Defence Union’ 
The second pro-Brexit logic is likely to emanate from frustrations in European member states 
among those who feel that the UK is an impediment to EU integration, framing their 
arguments as a pro-EU stance that sees greater opportunities for ‘ever closer union’ in an EU 
without the UK. This logic has been largely absent from the wider Brexit debate thus far, but 
is evident in the results of surveys among Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). A 
2013 survey by ComRes found that 20 per cent of MEPs considered that the EU would be 
better off if the UK left, and 53 per cent thought that the EU ‘should be working towards 
becoming a unified state such as “The United States of Europe”’.55 It is noteworthy that the 
underlying reasoning here has some similarities with the view that the right way to solve the 
continuing ‘euro problem’ is for Germany to leave, on the grounds that many of the 
difficulties have their source in German deflation.56  
If it were to gain traction, a pro-EU, pro-Brexit position is likely to follow the same logics of 
pooled defence resources, Europeanist outlook and Europeanization of defence markets 
employed by the pro-EU, pro-Remain camp to advocate an ‘unleashed continental Europe’.57 
This perspective is likely to deploy the argument that if the UK were to leave the EU then the 
remaining member states would have the opportunity to develop plans for ‘a fully-fledged 
Political Union with a European Defence Union (EDU)’.58 The process of closer political 
union, it might be argued, would enable ambitious integrationist steps to consolidate the 
CSDP, create a ‘European army’ and develop the EDTIB, unhindered by anti-integrationist 
opposition from the UK.  
Narratives over evidence: who will win the national security battleground?  
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We have identified above four different ‘logics’ that characterize claims about the benefits 
and costs of British EU membership for defence procurement and the defence industry. Our 
contention is that these same arguments will be deployed to support their respective pro-
Brexit and pro-Remain campaigns: ‘logics’ 1 and 4 by pro-Brexit campaigners, ‘logics’ 2 and 
3 by pro-Remain campaigners.  
In practice, ‘logic 4’—which sees the UK as a barrier to other EU member states’ desire for 
greater political and, by extension, defence union—is likely to be largely irrelevant in UK or 
wider EU Brexit debates, or in determining UK voter preferences in the forthcoming UK 
referendum. There is no evidence to suggest that it represents anything other than a minority 
perspective within EU public opinion or political elites. For UK voters, it presents a self-
refuting proposition, representing a position in which the UK leaves the EU on the grounds 
not that it would be best for the UK, but that it would be best for the EU. For those in the UK 
who side with the pro-UK, pro-Brexit campaign, the merit of ‘logic 4’ would be that its mere 
articulation might increase animosity towards the EU in the British electorate, thereby 
goading ‘undecided’ voters towards the ‘Leave’ option. Ultimately, it is difficult to see 
benefit for any party in deploying this logic and so we do not see it as a likely position for 
any party in the referendum.  
The remaining three ‘logics’ are more likely to form the bases of the key positions advocated 
by politicians, parties, institutions and interest groups in the UK and other EU member states. 
In terms of the forthcoming in–out referendum, the debate is likely to be dominated by the 
clash between ‘logic 1’ (‘Leaving will not undermine the UK’s defence procurement options 
or industrial capabilities’) and ‘logic 2’ (‘There’s nothing to lose by staying in, but there are 
manifold risks for the UK in leaving’). As we have shown, both logics share the same core 
normative assumptions and approaches. Both emphasize the primacy of defence sovereignty, 
both advocate a Euro-Atlanticist approach and both argue that the UK will benefit from 
access (whether from outside or inside the EU) to a liberalized European defence market. 
Essentially, then, both logics deploy the same arguments, but take them in opposite directions 
because they are based on different attitudes towards integration. 
In our view, this is why ‘logic 3’ (‘Leaving will undermine the EU’s defence industry so that 
the EU and UK will rely on the US to an even greater extent’) will be the critical battleground 
of the national security debate in the UK’s in–out referendum. Because the essence of ‘logic 
1’ is that the UK will be no worse off in defence procurement and industrial terms following 
a Brexit, advocates of ‘logic 2’ are likely to deploy elements of ‘logic 3’ in their strategies to 
tip the balance of the narrative in their favour. Splicing ‘logics 2 and 3’ together, those in the 
  
‘Remain’ camp are likely to argue that leaving the EU comes with manifold risks such as 
having to rely to a greater extent on the United States, thereby jeopardizing the UK’s ability 
to act independently and attenuating UK sovereignty. For their part, the ‘Leave’ campaign 
will be forced to reiterate that a Brexit offers greater independence in procurement and 
defence-industrial choices and to assert that, out of the EU, the UK has the opportunity to be 
more supportive of its own defence markets. 
‘Logic 3’ is, then, likely to be pivotal for both pro-Brexit and pro-Remain campaigners in the 
crucial national security aspect of the referendum debates. Part of the challenge facing the 
UK electorate is the paucity of hard evidence on which to make informed decisions and the 
multiplicity of ‘known unknowns’. Logics 1, 2, and 3 each make claims about a future that is 
unclear, with a range of variables that are unknowable, in a world which is uncertain. In the 
absence of evidence, the battles between advocates of the various logics will be fought 
through competing narratives and assertions about the desirability of integration, rather than 
over a base of rigorous evidence. Consequently, the outcomes of these debates in terms of 
electoral decision will not necessarily be based on strategic advantage or the UK’s place in 
the world and role in international affairs, but rather on a whole series of arguments relating 
to sovereignty, autonomy, protectionism and competition. 
This is worrying, for a number of reasons. In the first instance, the debate around integration 
is highly partisan and ideological and so there is a real possibility that long-term choices will 
be coloured by the politics of integration, rather than the evidence relating to the defence-
industrial base and defence acquisition. In the second place, even should the evidence base be 
marshalled to support competing claims and counter-claims in the national security arena, 
that evidence base is itself far from robust. The EU’s own claims about the ‘costs of non-
Europe’ in the defence sector, for example, encompass an enormous range (€26–130 
billion)—a span so wide as to offer no kind of basis on which to make any real assessment 
about the economic costs and/or benefits of remaining.59  
Where does this leave us? Lacking the flesh and muscle of reliable, robust data and evidence, 
we have only the skeleton of a debate—a skeleton whose bones are ideological and political. 
In that respect, this part of the battle in the 2016 referendum will not be fought over 
competing data, but over competing narratives and arguments. When it comes down to it, the 
side that wins may be not the one that most acutely assesses the costs of going it alone or the 
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costs of sticking together, but the one that can compile the most comprehensive and 
compelling story to support its case. This will be a matter of spin: the winner, the side that 
can spin the argument most persuasively and attract the ‘undecideds’. Put in the shortest and 
most worrying terms, the key national security agenda will come down to little more than a 
spin of the wheel. 
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